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Self-regulation reflects an individual’s efforts to bring behavior and thinking into line with
often consciously desired goals. During endurance activity, self-regulation requires an
athlete to balance their speed or power output appropriately to achieve an optimal
level of performance. Considering that both behavior and thinking are core elements of
self-regulation, this article provides a cognitive perspective on the processes required for
effective pace-regulation during endurance performance.We also integrate this viewpoint
with physiological and performance outcomes during activity. As such, evidence is
presented to suggest that what an athlete thinks about has an important influence on
effort perceptions, physiological outcomes, and, consequently, endurance performance.
This article also provides an account of how an athlete might control their cognition
and focus attention during an endurance event. We propose that effective cognitive
control during performance requires both proactive, goal-driven processes and reactive,
stimulus-driven processes. In addition, the role of metacognition—or thinking about
thinking—in pace-regulation will also be considered. Metacognition is an essential
component of self-regulation and its primary functions are to monitor and control the
thoughts and actions required for task completion. To illustrate these processes in
action, a metacognitive framework of attentional focus and cognitive control is applied
to an endurance performance setting: specifically, Bradley Wiggins’ successful 2015
Hour record attempt in cycling. Finally, future perspectives will consider the potentially
deleterious effects of the sustained cognitive effort required during prolonged and
strenuous endurance tasks.
Keywords: self-regulation, pacing, endurance performance, attentional focus, cognitive control, metacognition,
cycling
INTRODUCTION: SELF-REGULATION AND ENDURANCE
PERFORMANCE
Self-regulation has been described as change to bring thinking and behavior into accord with
often consciously desired standards or goals (Forgas et al., 2009). Applied to athletic endeavor,
endurance athletes must regulate speed or power output in an attempt to achieve an optimal level
of performance (Foster et al., 1994; de Koning et al., 2011; deMorree andMarcora, 2013). Successful
performance regularly depends on the selection of an appropriate pacing strategy, avoiding a
slower-than-optimal pace and underperformance, or an over-exuberant pace during the initial
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stages of activity and, subsequently, premature fatigue (e.g.,
Abbiss and Laursen, 2008; Renfree and St Clair Gibson, 2013;
Hanley, 2016). Perhaps nowhere is pacing as quintessentially
self -regulated as during an individual time-trial, where pacing
strategy is minimally influenced by other athletes or competitors,
for example (e.g., Williams et al., 2015; Konings et al.,
2016). One notable example is the Hour in cycling, an event
where the performer attempts to cycle as far as possible
within the allotted time. Completing the Hour successfully
requires a consideration of numerous performance factors,
including physical, nutritional, biomechanical, environmental,
technological, and psychological variables (Zabala and Hopker,
2015). In 2015, Bradley Wiggins established a new ‘official’ world
Hour record, achieving a distance of 54.526 km. Emphasizing the
regulatory balancing-act required to optimally pace the Hour,
the “non-official” world record holder, Chris Boardman (who
completed a distance of 56.375 km in 1996 prior to rule changes
governing the use of technology; see Zabala and Hopker, 2015),
has suggested that, “In theHour, you carry any mistakes with you
until the end, so pacing is everything” (Wiggins, 2015, p. 13).
Much debate surrounds the processes underpinning pace-
regulation during endurance activity (Abbiss et al., 2015; Renfree
et al., 2015). Important recent considerations include affective
state (e.g., Renfree et al., 2012; Jones et al., 2015; Rhoden et al.,
2015), decision making processes (Renfree et al., 2014; Smits
et al., 2014), and risk perception (Micklewright et al., 2015).
However, perceived exertion has repeatedly been suggested
as a key modulator of exercise intensity (e.g., de Koning
et al., 2011; Eston, 2012; Smits et al., 2014) and is central to
prominent models of self-paced endurance performance such
as the psychobiological model (e.g., Marcora, 2010; Pageaux,
2014), and the perception-based model (Tucker, 2009). Perceived
exertion has been defined as a subjective feeling of how hard
or strenuous a physical task is (Borg, 1998). Despite conceptual
differences on the neurophysiologic basis of effort perception and
control of pacing (i.e., conscious or non-conscious; see St Clair
Gibson et al., 2006; Tucker, 2009; Marcora, 2010), there is general
consensus that any factor which influences perception of effort
will indirectly alter pace-regulation (e.g., Marcora, 2010; Noakes,
2012).Much evidence supports this contention during endurance
performance. For example, manipulation of physiological (e.g.,
Tucker and Noakes, 2009), pharmacological (e.g., Doherty and
Smith, 2005), and environmental (e.g., competitor presence;
Corbett et al., 2012; Williams et al., 2015) variables have
each been shown to impact self-paced endurance performance
via a dissociation of the effort perception—exercise intensity
relationship.
Recent reviews of both attentional focus (Brick et al.,
2014) and psychological determinants of whole-body endurance
performance (McCormick et al., 2015) have also highlighted
how each of these factors impact on effort perception
and pace-regulation. Given that self-regulation requires both
behavior (e.g., pacing) and thinking (e.g., attention) be in-
line with sought after goals (Forgas et al., 2009), an increased
understanding of the cognitive processes involved is important
to illuminate a discussion on the regulation of endurance
performance. The aim of this article, therefore, is to present,
and integrate, a cognitive perspective on pace-regulation with
effort perception, physiological, and performance outcomes
during endurance activity. In terms of cognitive processes,
the emphasis will be on attentional strategies that have been
shown to impact each of these variables. This article will also
consider the role of metacognition in self-regulated endurance
performance.
THINKING AND PACING: ATTENTIONAL
FOCUS AND COGNITIVE CONTROL
An endurance athlete’s focus of attention can have a significant
effect on effort perception, pace-regulation, and physiological
indices of performance (Brick et al., 2014). Focusing on self-
regulatory cognitions such as technique or cadence/rhythm, for
example, has been shown to optimize pacing without necessarily
increasing the effort perceived during endurance running (e.g.,
Donohue et al., 2001), race-walking (e.g., Clingman and Hilliard,
1990), rowing (e.g., Connolly and Janelle, 2003), and swimming
(e.g., Couture et al., 1999) tasks. Similarly, focusing on relaxing
results in an improved movement economy (i.e., reduced oxygen
cost) during endurance activity (e.g., Caird et al., 1999). Not all
attentional foci are beneficial to performance, however. Focusing
excessively on internal bodily sensations or automated processes
may exacerbate effort perceptions and negatively impact pacing
(e.g., Harte and Eifert, 1995; Stanley et al., 2007) or movement
economy (e.g., Schücker et al., 2014), for example. Furthermore,
though distractive strategies tend to reduce effort perceptions
(e.g., focusing on one’s environment; Stanley et al., 2007) this may
be at the expense of a slower-than-optimum pace during self-
paced endurance activity (e.g., Scott et al., 1999; Connolly and
Janelle, 2003).
What these studies highlight is the interaction between
endurance athletes’ cognitions and subsequent effort perception,
physiological, and performance outcomes. Recent evidence also
suggests that the most appropriate attentional strategies during
performance may depend on the demands of the situation
(Brick et al., 2015). For instance, during a self-paced time-
trial this may be to cope with distractions, or to overcome
debilitating perceptions of effort while attempting to optimize
performance. As such, adopting a context-appropriate focus of
attention requires both a domain-specific knowledge of cognitive
strategies (e.g., MacIntyre et al., 2014) and cognitive control,
or the ability to regulate thoughts and actions in accord with
behavioral goals (e.g., Robertson et al., 2015; Licˇen et al.,
2016). According to the dual mechanisms of control framework
(Braver et al., 2007), cognitive control operates via two distinct
modes: proactive control and reactive control (Braver et al.,
2007; Braver, 2012). Proactive control involves anticipatory, goal-
oriented processing of information so that attention (e.g., focus),
perception (e.g., of effort), and action (e.g., pacing) are biased in
a goal-driven manner (Miller and Cohen, 2001; Braver, 2012).
In contrast, reactive, or stimulus-driven cognitive control (Miller
and Cohen, 2001; Corbetta and Shulman, 2002; Braver, 2012)
is more automatic and transient, and reacts to urgent events
or conflict by engaging control only if required (Braver et al.,
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2007). Accordingly, reactive cognitive control is implicated in
default mode processing and is less demanding on cognitive
resources (e.g., working memory), whereas proactive control
is engaged in more effortful situations and places a greater
demand on cognitive resources (Braver, 2012; Braver et al.,
2007).
Brick et al. (2015, 2016) recently proposed that both context-
dependent proactive and reactive cognitive control are initiated
during endurance activity. In a study involving 3 km time-trial
running, the findings on the attentional focus of participants
during a self-controlled pace trial (i.e., focus on pacing,
monitoring distance information, and “chunking,” or mentally
breaking the distance down to smaller segments) suggested both
proactive and reactive forms of control were important to pace-
regulation. However, when an equivalent pacing strategy was
externally-controlled by the experimenter (akin to pace-making),
the most frequently reported attentional foci (i.e., relaxing,
optimizing running action) suggested reactive control was the
predominant form of cognitive control. Heart rate was also 2%
lower in the externally-controlled condition when compared
with the self-controlled pace trial, possibly as a result of the
cognitive strategies engaged (Brick et al., 2016). Applying these
findings to endurance performance, we propose that effective
pace-regulation requires the athlete to adopt a situationally-
appropriate focus of attention and mode of cognitive control.
During an event such as the Hour, for example, the athlete
receives minimal and infrequent external feedback on pacing.
Accordingly, perceptions of effort may serve a vital role in pace-
regulation, particularly in the early stages of the event. During
the latter stages, however, when the athlete begins to fatigue,
cognitive strategies becomemore important to overcome an ever-
increasing sense of effort and maintain a target pace. In support
of this contention, Chris Boardman has suggested that pacing
in the Hour is an equation with three inter-related questions:
how long to go, how hard the athlete is trying, and whether that
effort sustainable? He suggests the “unnerving” answer to the
latter question is “maybe” (Wiggins, 2015, p. 13). Accordingly,
to achieve a desired standard the athlete must proactively adopt
a focus of attention to cope with task demands in a goal-driven
manner. However, when faced with an unexpected event (e.g.,
getting distracted, errors in pacing strategy) the endurance athlete
must also reactively adapt cognition when required to optimize
performance or maintain positive affect, for example (e.g., Carver
and Scheier, 1998; Rhoden et al., 2015).
To conclude so far, we have presented evidence to suggest
what an athlete thinks about influences effort perceptions,
physiological outcomes and, consequently, endurance
performance. In turn, these effects of various cognitive
strategies may explain when and why an athlete will engage a
particular focus. Additionally, cognitive control, or the ability
to regulate thoughts and actions (e.g., Braver et al., 2007)
provides an insight into an athlete’s ability to align thinking with
performance tasks and goals. A final consideration, however, is
how an athlete controls cognition and focuses attention during
endurance performance. In the following section we apply
Brick et al.’s (2015) metacognitive framework of attentional





Metacognition has been defined as an individual’s knowledge
and cognitions about cognitive phenomena (Flavell, 1979)
or, more simply, as “thinking about thinking” (Miller et al.,
1970, p. 613). Metacognition can also reflect an individual’s
understanding of what they know and how to use that knowledge
to regulate behavior (Bransford et al., 1999; Tomporowski et al.,
2015). Metacognition not only consists of conscious goals, but
also the activation of strategies (i.e., thoughts, behaviors) to
achieve those goals (Flavell, 1979). It is also important to note
that although self-regulation and metacognition have distinct
origins in psychology, metacognition is considered an essential
component of effective self-regulation (Dinsmore et al., 2008;
Efklides, 2008; Tarricone, 2011). Accordingly, Dinsmore et al.
(2008) highlight a “conceptual core” (p. 404) binding self-
regulation and metacognition that involves efforts to monitor
thoughts and actions, and activity to gain control over them.
As such, this section will attempt to shed further light on how
endurance athletes monitor and control the thoughts and actions
required for effective pace-regulation.
Brick et al. (2015) recently proposed a metacognitive
framework of attentional focus and cognitive control during
endurance performance. Based on the facets of metacognition
(e.g., Efklides, 2008), this model comprises two distinct
processes: metacognitive skills and metacognitive experiences.
Metacognitive skills include planning prior to performance
(e.g., of cognitive strategies), monitoring during performance
(e.g., of thinking and task completion), and reviewing and
evaluating after performance (e.g., of cognitive strategies and
task performance). Metacognitive experiences, in turn, are
based predominantly on monitoring processes and include
both implicit and explicit metacognitive feelings (e.g., feeling of
difficulty) and explicit metacognitive judgments and estimates
(e.g., judging whether a cognitive strategy is effective for its
intended purpose). Relevant to this perspective, Efklides (2008),
for example, suggests that metacognitive experiences such as
feelings of task difficulty are crucial for the self-regulation of
effort.
The most relevant metacognitive skills to the present
discussion are planning andmonitoring processes.Metacognitive
planning may incorporate proactive goal setting, establishing
a desired pacing strategy, or the selection of other cognitive
strategies to implement during performance (Brick et al.,
2015). Metacognitive planning may be particularly important
when an athlete wishes to minimalize interference from
potential distractors (Miller and Cohen, 2001; Braver et al.,
2007). In contrast, metacognitive monitoring predominantly
involves reactive or stimulus-driven cognitive control during
task performance (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002; Braver et al.,
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FIGURE 1 | Illustrative examples adapted from Wiggins (2015) of metacognitive planning of a cognitive strategy before performance (A),
metacognitive monitoring and reactive cognitive control during performance (B), and proactive cognitive control during performance (C).
2007). Brick et al. (2015), for example, demonstrated how
elite endurance runners had, through experience, developed
a means of prioritizing sensory information to optimize
endurance performance. Accordingly, periodic monitoring of
internal sensory (e.g., perceived exertion) and/or relevant
outward environmental (e.g., split times, competitors) sources of
information generate implicit or explicit metacognitive feelings
that form a representation of the task. Thus, while monitoring
and control can occur at an implicit, non-conscious level,
conscious control is engaged when metacognitive feelings (e.g.,
feeling of difficulty) form a representation and awareness of the
task (e.g., pace is too hard) that requires an appropriate response
(see Efklides, 2008). This response may be to reactively engage a
cognitive strategy to cope with situational demands (e.g., focus
on task-relevant stimuli) or to adopt a more appropriate pacing
strategy, for example. Once initiated, the athlete may make a
more explicit metacognitive judgment (e.g., this is working to
maintain pace) regarding the appropriateness of their adopted
focus of attention (Brick et al., 2015). Based on the outcome of
this judgment, the athlete may decide to maintain their current
focus, or implement an alternative, more suitable cognitive
strategy.
Metacognitive skills (e.g., planning, monitoring) and
experiences (e.g., feelings, judgments) may explain how
endurance athletes focus attention, control cognition, and,
in turn, regulate pacing. Accordingly, we propose that an
athlete’s efforts to monitor and control their thoughts and
actions reflect the conceptual core linking metacognition
and self-regulation in an endurance performance context
(Dinsmore et al., 2008). To provide greater insight into these
cognitive and metacognitive processes in action, the following
section will integrate the theoretical constructs of attentional
focus, cognitive control, and metacognitive processes with a
real-world example of self-regulated pacing during endurance
performance (i.e., Bradley Wiggins’ successful 2015 Hour record
attempt).
THINKING AND ACTION: COGNITIVE AND
METACOGNITIVE PROCESSES DURING
ENDURANCE PERFORMANCE
Many strategic considerations prior to Bradley Wiggins’ 2015
Hour record attempt reflect metacognitive planning. His target
pace (16.1 s per lap) and cadence (105 rpm) were carefully
calculated to optimize his capabilities to achieve a pre-event goal
distance of 55.2 km (Wiggins, 2015). One pre-planned cognitive
strategy was to mentally chunk the 60 min event into blocks
of 12 min, a strategy that evolved during training for the Hour
(i.e. reflecting metacognitive planning; see Figure 1A). Although
chunking as a strategy has not been investigated experimentally
per se, reflective accounts (Brick et al., 2015, 2016) suggest that
chunking may assist pace-related decision making by allowing
the athlete set shorter-term goals within a longer duration
endurance event.
It is also likely that the cognitive strategies Wiggins
subsequently engaged during the Hour evolved from his 23
years’ experience as a cyclist and domain-specific expertise
as an elite time-trialist (Micklewright et al., 2010; Wiggins,
2012; MacIntyre et al., 2014). In this regard, evidence from
his autobiographical account (Wiggins, 2015) suggests Wiggins
employed both proactive and reactive cognitive control during
theHour. For example, during the initial stages when the pace felt
easier (based on a metacognitive feeling of difficulty), he recounts
self-instructions to start focusing, listening to his body, and to
concentrate on the effort (i.e., reactive cognitive control; see
Figure 1B). During the latter stages, however, Wiggins initiated
three attentional strategies to maintain pacing and performance
in a goal-driven manner (i.e., proactive cognitive control; see
Figure 1C). These strategies were relaxation, focusing on form
(technique), and synchronizing his pedaling rhythm with the
track’s banking and straight sections (Wiggins, 2015). Focusing
on these active self-regulatory strategies has been shown to
improve movement economy (e.g., relaxation; Caird et al., 1999),
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and optimize pacing without elevating effort perceptions further
(e.g., technique and rhythm/cadence; Clingman and Hilliard,
1990; Connolly and Janelle, 2003). It is also noteworthy that when
unexpectedly high atmospheric pressure meant his goal pace
and distance may not have been attainable on the day; Wiggins
recalculated his target Hour record pace (to 16.4 s per lap),
thereby maintaining goal commitment and a positive affective
state (Rhoden et al., 2015; Wiggins, 2015).
This illustrative example supports the notion that efforts to
monitor and control thoughts and action link self-regulation
and metacognition (Dinsmore et al., 2008; Tarricone, 2011).
Furthermore, it reinforces the relationships between attentional
focus, and physiologic and performance outcomes during a
mentally and physically strenuous task such as an individual
time-trial. As such, we suggest that further elucidation of our
understanding of pace-regulation during endurance tasks will
only be possible with continued integration of these scientific
branches of endurance research.
FUTURE PERSPECTIVES
The present article has highlighted the roles of attentional focus,
cognitive control, and metacognition in self-regulated endurance
performance. One issue worthy of further consideration concerns
suggestions that inducing mental fatigue prior to activity may
subsequently elevate effort perceptions and diminish endurance
task performance (e.g., Marcora et al., 2009; MacMahon et al.,
2014; Pageaux et al., 2015). Indeed, Marcora et al. (2009)
suggest that both mentally and physically demanding tasks share
the same neurocognitive resources. As such, mental fatigue
may exert an influence on endurance performance by altering
perceptions of effort independent of changes in cardiorespiratory
or musculoenergetic mechanisms (Marcora et al., 2009). Despite
these findings, no published study has specifically focused
on the effects of mental fatigue accrued during sustained
endurance performance. However, researchers have recently
begun to speculate that prolonged endurance activity in itself
may induce mental fatigue (Renfree et al., 2015; Brick et al.,
2016) and reduce regulatory control (e.g., Rhoden et al., 2015).
More so, while this perspective article has primarily considered
pace-regulation in the context of individual time-trialing,
competitive endurance events also require strategic decision-
making during performance based on additional environmental
factors, including competitor behavior, for example (e.g., Smits
et al., 2014; Hanley, 2015; Konings et al., 2016). Given the
importance of cognitive functioning to sustained endurance
activity (e.g., Cona et al., 2015), deteriorations in performance
during the latter stages of demanding endurance tasks may be
in part attributable to increased mental fatigue and a reduced
ability to maintain self-regulatory control. Further, investigation
of these issues may provide a fruitful line of enquiry. It may
be that additional performance gains are possible by reducing
the cognitive demands associated with prolonged endurance
activity. This may be achieved by adopting an appropriate focus
of attention (e.g., relaxing), for example, or by utilizing pace-
makers to reduce pace-related decisionmaking during prolonged
endurance events.
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